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Personal Deductions and the Federal
Income Tax--Some Suggestions
for Revisions*
By RAY TRAmMELt
Enlightened tax laws, or for that matter any laws, are the
result of continuous reappraisal and revision. On November 16,
1959, the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Represen-
tatives, United States Congress, began public hearings designed
to gather information and materials as a basis for a substantial
revision of the federal income tax statutes. According to the
Committee the present income tax law was to be analyzed, by the
witnesses appearing before it, in terms of certain stated criteria.
These included achieving the following objectives: (1) a tax
climate more favorable to economic growth; (2) greater equity
through closer adherence to the principle that equal incomes
should bear equal tax liabilities; (3) assurance that the degree of
progression in the distribution of tax burdens accords as closely
as possible with widely-held standards of fairness; (4) an overall
tax system which contributes significantly to maintaining stability
in the general price level and a stable and high rate of use of
human and material resources; (5) a tax system which interferes
as little as possible with the operation of the free market mech-
anism in directing resources into their most productive uses; and
(6) greater ease of taxpayer compliance and administration by the
government. This meant an appraisal of the so-called "loop-
holes" or preferred treatments which have been added to the
Internal Revenue Code from time to time for the benefit of selec-
ted groups of taxpayers in order to see whether the resulting
erosin of the tax base is justified today in terms of the public
interest.
* Ongmnally published in 14 Ark. L. Rev. 26 (1960).
t Professor of Law, Umversity of Arkansas.
PERSONAL DEDUCrIONS AND THE FEERAL INCoux TAX
Every deduction, exclusion or credit which is granted upon
special conditions to some, but not all, taxpayers serves to re-
duce the factor of "income" which is to be multiplied by the
percentage "rates" in order to compute the tax. To the extent
some taxpayers get preferred treatment in computing "income,"
the uniform rates produce a smaller tax for them than for their
fellow citizens. This in turn means that the rates must be in-
creased to produce sufficient revenues. The principle of tax-
ation according to ability to pay, which has been written into
the statutes through use of the progressive rate feature (tax
brackets), is thereby undercut. Persons with large incomes are not
necessarily paying more tax. All of us are aware of tax-sheltered
forms of investment where the entire economic gain either escapes
taxation or is taxed in a more advantageous manner The Com-
mittee announced that it would investigate the practical possi-
bilities of abolishing these preferences and thereby broadening
the tax base sufficiently to permit significant reductions in indi-
vidual and corporation income tax rates without sacrificing the
revenues needed by the Government.1
Congressman Mills (D., Ark.) and his Committee will hold
public hearings on specific drafts of any tax revision bills which
result from this study. As a first stage of the revision project,
however, the Committee assigned specified portions of the In-
ternal Revenue Code to certain professors of economics and of
law, to lawyers and accountants, and to tax experts drawn from
labor, business, agriculture and research organizations, for the
preparation of detailed critical studies well in advance of the
scheduled public hearings. Their product was then made avail-
able to the Committee in the form of both written and oral testi-
I This quest is analogous to that which has, in recent years, been in process
in Arkansas in the field of property taxation. Here, we have been increasing as-
sessments to figures more nearly reflecting true market value of property with
the objective of reducing the millage levied against this valuation to produce the
tax payable. Although the tax "rates" are commonly understood to mean the
percentages wuch are used in the multiplication process (as, "20% bracket," "2%
sales tax,' or "mill rate"), in theory and in result this so-called "rate" is significant
only when considered in conjunction with the base against which it is multiplied
("income," "assessed value," etc.). The rate is the ratio between the two factors.
In truth, both factors constitute the rate since "rate of" is meaningless unless the
other factor be described. See, e.g., Morley v. Remmel, 215 Ark. 434 (1949),
where this distinction resulted in a split decision. The same amount of revenue
may be produced by reducing one and increasing the other. To the extent that
inequities are eliminated, however, any individual taxpayer may contribute more
or less of the total revenue than he formerly did.
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mony.! The following constitutes the writers testimony, prepared
at the invitation of the Committee, on an assignment to investi-
gate the area of individual personal deductions! In the presenta-
tion to the Committee it was prefaced by these remarks:
If the income tax is to be broadened-an announced
goal of this Committee-it is appropriate to review the per-
sonal deductions and the possibility of placing some limita-
tions upon those now recognized because these deductions
reduce taxable income by an amount approaching forty
billion dollars annually.
But I personally would not favor any restrictions on the
deductions presently allowed unless this would be accom-
panied by a reduction in the percentage rates at-each brac-
ket together with the creation of a new bracket at a rate
lower than the present twenty percent one and the shifting
of a substantial number of taxpayers into that new bracket.
If the rates are to be lowered, for both high bracket
and low bracket taxpayers, then the personal deductions
could be revised by either (1) abolishing all of these deduc-
tions completely and reducing the rates proportionate to
the gain in amount of revenues, or (2) if not possible or
feasible to abolish all of them completely, present deduc-
tions could be more equitably extended through the impo-
sition of "ceiling" and "floor" provisions where not now
used, or by the substitutions of "credits" for deductions.
The greatest possible parity between taxpayers would re-
sult from abolishing all these deductions. It is legally pos-
sible to abolish these deductions for they are not consti-
tutionally assured.
If the deductions are to be retained, revision is required
to point up the definitions of the deductible events and to
clarify and terminate existing inequities. My research offers
some twenty-nine definite suggestions to those ends.
One approaches the subject of income tax revision with some
trepidation. Knowledgeable authorities have already spoken.
4
2 The written research articles-some 2,500 pages in length-have been printed
by the Government Printing Office in three volumes. House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., Tax Revision Compendium: Compendium of Papers
on Broadening the Tax Base (Comm. Print 1959). The oral testimony will be pub-
lished in the form of Committee Hearings.
3 This material is in substance the same as that submitted to the Committee
and which appears in Tax Revision Compendium, supra note 2, v. 1 at 457.
The introductory material and the footnotes have been added in tlus revised
version.
4 Surrey, The Federal Income Tax Base for Indivduals, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 815
(1958); Paul, Erosion of the Tax Base and Rate Structure, 11 Tax L. Rev. 203
(1956); Pechman, Erosion of the Inditndual Income Tax, 10 Nnt'l Tax J. 1 (1957).
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Too, one cannot be optimistic about possible achievements flow-
ing from tax revision attempts.5
Deductions of personal expenses to the extent now permitted
are the privilege and the prerogative of certain groups and their
disturbance quite naturally has political implications. Never-
theless, the suggestions to follow, made after study but modestly
advanced, emanate from what is believed to be a disinterested
source.
The largest single factor eroding the tax base involves the
"grace-of-Congress" deductions for individuals. These expendi-
tures are nonbusiness in character and not connected with profit-
seeking transactions. They include, principally, extraordinary
medical expenses, charitable contributions, interest on personal
debts, personal taxes, casualty losses on nonbusiness assets, child
care expense, and the payment of alimony Their benefit is not
always equitably distributed. Occasionally their form leaves hard-
ship cases unbenefited.
The stated objectives of the Committee on Ways and Means.
are to broaden the base upon which the federal income tax is
levied and by so doing be enabled to lower tax rates. This would
make the rates more realistic, stopping leakage and favoritism
which undercuts the stated rates when compared with the effec-
tive rates, and restore the ability-to-pay principle to full vigor
through proper emphasis on the progressive rate feature of the
tax statute. We are asked to investigate for equity and fairness
and progression in distribution of the tax burden, yet so frame
provisions as to allow for free play of the market in allocating
resources, provide a climate for economic growth, and -facilitate
taxpayer compliance and Treasury Department policing.
For 1957 taxable income was $149.4 billion. Itemized deduc-
tions totaled $25.7 billion. The amount of each separate deduc-
tion was not tabulated. The last such tabulation (1956 returns)
showed these deductions:6
5 Bluni, Simplification of the Federal Income Tax Law, 10 Tax L. Rev. 20-39
(1954).
6 Average deductions for returns having itemized deductions filed in 1958
are not available. Similar figures for returns in 1957 show these personal deduc
tions:
Interest $260.00-Item was deducted on 74% of returns
Taxes $315.00-Item was deducted on 95% of returns
(Continued on next page)
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1956
Taxes ........................................................ $5.8 billion
Interest .................................................... $4.8 billion
Contributions .......................................... $4.9 billion
Medical .................................................... $3.5 billion
Child Care .............................................. $ .1 billion
Casualty losses ........................................ $ .3 billion
Miscellaneous ........................................ $3.2 billion
TOTAL .................................... $22.6 billion
In addition an estimated $13 billion or more was deducted
through the standard deduction. Thus, the total personal deduc-
tion figure approached $40 billion.
In terms of average adjusted gross income, the largest de-
ductions of this character at different income levels for 1956 were,
in order of importance: 7
$5,000-$10,000
1. Interest
2. Taxes
3. Medical
$15,000-$100,000
Taxes
Medical
Interest or
contributions
$100,000 or over
1. Contributions
2. Taxes
3. Interest
The first, and obvious, suggestion is to requtre taxpayers
to use an optional standard deduction calling for a "flat" amount
and abolish itemizing of deductions of this type in al cases.8
(This, of course, would be roughly equivalent to increasing the
personal exemptions or reducing the rates and abolishing all per-
sonal deductions completelyl) At present the standard deduc-
tion, sections 141-45, 9 permits a subtraction of approximately
10% of adjusted gross income where income is less than $5,000,
and the smaller of a flat $1,000 or 10% of adjusted gross where
it is $5,000 or more. Taxpayers may elect its use in lieu of itemiz-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Contributions $253.00-Item was deducted on 95% of returns
Medical $188.00-Item was deducted on 57% of returns
Source: U. S. Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income
-1956, Individual Tax Returns (Sept. 1958).
7 See table showing itenzed deductions taken by each of eleven income
classes (average adjusted gross incomes) for 1956, CCH 1959 Stand. Fed. Tax
Rep. 18786A.
8 E.g., for returns filed in 1957, taxpayers in the $4500-$5000 gross income
bracket, who itemized, claimed total personal deductions, on the average, of
$947.00. U.-S. Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service, op. cit. supra
note 6.
9 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §§141-45 [hereinafter referred to by sec-
tion number alone].
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ing and do where it is more generous in amount than the total
of actual expenditures would be itemized.
For the taxable year 1954 it is estimated that 72% of the
returns utilized the present standard deductions. 10 For 1953,
it is said, personal deductions totaled $34 billion of which $18
billion was through use of the standard deduction. Of the other
$21 billion itemized, those taxpayers would have been permitted
$10 billion if they had used the optional standard deduction.
Hence tins proposal would, for that year at least, have added
$11 billion to the tax base and thus permitted a substantial rate
reduction.
The mandatory standard deduction would be less equitable
than itemized deductions since it would operate on a rough
approximation of expenses m so-called average cases. The non-
average hardship affecting ability to pay would go unrecognized.
To be balanced against this would be the value of ease of com-
pliance for taxpayers and a reduction in administrative costs
for the Treasury Ease of compliance intended by the present
provision is mitigated by its optional character. The prudent
taxpayer now makes both computations before electing the one
making for the greater savings.
The Committee might consider fragmenting the standard
deduction, in the event it is decided not to require its use by all,
so that a flat figure becomes a floor provision on each type of
deduction item. This would care for the hardship case as to any
one deduction. It would reduce the homeowners' advantage
(seen hereafter) in more easily exceeding ,the flat figure when
these items are totaled.
Assuming that the standard deduction section remains sub-
stantially unchanged and continues to be elective in nature, some
specific suggestions for revision follow
CONTRIBUTIONS: SECTION 170
1. The Committee might consider making it permissible to
deduct a sum where the taxpayer has contributed his blood to
a qualified non-profit organization. Under an interpretation of
1OBittker, Federal Income Estate and Gift Taxation 154 (2d ed. 1958). Yet
for 1957 returns, 33.7% itermzed personal deductions. U. S. Treasury Department,
Internal Revenue Service, op. cit. supra note 6, -at 3.
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the language of Section 170, no deduction is at present allowed."
While it is true that the human body is not property and hence
there cannot be a "payment" of it as the statute requires, there
is also some illogic in denominating this equivalent to the rendi-
tion of services to the organization. Some importance should
be attached to the fact that something tangible changes hands,
moving from the individual to the organization and being de-
flected by it to the benefit of persons in need in furtherance of a
general charitable purpose. Existing inequity would be removed
in allowing this deduction. This situation appears to be men-
tonous in the extreme.
Solution: A specific amendment to section 170 expressly rec-
ognizing donations of taxpayers blood as within the definition
of permitted "contribution." The deduction would be allowed
according to fair market value as is now the rule as to donations
of property 12
2. Where a present gift of a future interest in property
is made, the donation accelerates the deduction when compared
to the time of enjoyment of the donee-charity This lifetime
transfer not only moves donations forward so that they offset
the income tax rates rather than the lower estate tax rates, but
moves them perhaps from the lower bracket retirement period
to the current high bracket earning period. And, the taxpayer
and his family can continue to enjoy the present interest in
the property This problem is best seen in the context of one
who acquires a work of art and contemporaneously gives the
future ownership of it to a qualified museum or educational
institution. The current deduction for the future interest "funds"
the acquisition, while he and his family and friends enjoy the
1I Rev. l1ul. 162. 1953-2 Cui. Bull. 127- Special Ruling of Man 25, 1943.
l2Tlhe possible cost of tins new deduction in terms of revenue loss may be
seen from the amount of blood donations. The Amienean Red Cross, including
afTiliated hospitals. for the period July 1, 1958, through June 30, 1959, received
donations of 2.367,525 pints of blood. American Red Cross, Office of Research
Inilonation. Report of July 27, 1959. in a study conducted by the American
Association of Blood Banks in 1958, 26 large coninunitv blood banks and 22
large hospital blood banks reported that they averaged 34% of their blood supply
from prod donors. aind the remainder from contributors who replace blood used
liv fnends or relatives. It is estimated that approximately 4 million pints are
voluntarilv contributed out of the 51y, million pints now being used .nuallv In this
coultrv Correspondence with Secretary, American Association of Blood Banks,
Nov. 19, 1959.
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possession of the object for the life of the taxpayer or for a stated
number of years."3 It is recogmzed that any tightening of the
statute here would remove or dimimsh an incentive for the
adequate supplying of museums and educational institutions.
Yet the area illustrated is one where a taxpayer may have his
cake and gets to eat it too.14 It would seem only fair to weigh
the impact of all gifts equally and hence correlate the deduction
with the time of enjoyment by the donee-organization. The pro-
posal here might also remove present doubts which exist as to
deductibility of gifts of a future right to income as well.1-
Solution: Postpone the deduction to the year when the organ-
ization takes the whole of enjoyment and possession of the
donated property There is precedent in the gift tax law [Sec-
tion 2503 (b)] for differentiation as to gifts of "future inter-
ests," defined not in property law terminology but as gifts where
enjoyment and possession are postponed due to restrictions placed
on the gift by the donor (or a pnor donor) and not due merely
to the inherent nature of the type of property involved. Where
the retained use-value is the chief purpose of ownership, a cur-
rent transfer of naked title would give rise to no deductible con-
tribution.
3. It is not completely clear whether the individual donor
may benefit from a contribution, other than through publicity
and self-satisfaction, and have it still qualify for deduction.',
The basic question is the ptblic purpose of the contribution.'-
A particularly foggy portion of this area is where the ultimate
beneficiary is a third person rather than the donor and vet the
13 See Rev. Rul 57-293, 1957-2 Gum. Bull. 153; Rev. Rul. 58-445, 1958 Int.
Rev. Bull. No. 37, at 30.
14 The deduction has the effect of improving spendable after-tax income
because the value of the reminder interest "bunclies' into the year of the donation
to offset income which would otherwise appear at the top of the income bracket.
The tax saved is saved currently and may be freely spent. To the extent income
offset includes capital gain, the net effective rate on capital gain is also reduced
by the gift.
15 Cf. Lester A. Nordan, 22 T.C. 1132 (1954) (non acq.) (appeal nolle pros).10 1f. Rev. Rul. 54-565, 1954-2 Gum. Bull. 95: where the organization treats
the contribution as "dues" and extends benefits and pnvileges to the pavor per-
sonally by reason of the donation, it is indicated there is no deduction under
section 170.
17 Cf. Restatement. Trusts §370, as to the charitable nature of a trust where
the donor retains for himself, or severely restricts, the selection of the ultimate
beneficiarv.
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donor himself selects or participates in the selection of the third
person. This is held not to prevent the deduction at times.18
However, it is sometimes invoked to deny the deduction. 9
Solution: Disallow a deduction where donor, either (1)
through reservation, condition or qualification which he, or a
donor prior to him, placed upon the donation, or (2) under a
promise made by the organization (either before or after the
date of the donation), or (3) is in fact allowed by the organiza-
tion to so act, either appoints, selects or participates in the selec-
tion of ultimate beneficiaries, or benefits personally in a pecun-
iary sense not available to members of the public generally This
suggestion attempts to clarify deductibility in an area where it
is not now clear and enhances predictibility of tax result. It rem.-
forces the idea of progression in rates by preventing deduction of
gifts and grants made indirectly to members of the taxpayer's
family or to his friends.
4. Section 170 permits deduction for contributions made to
groups
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or for the pre-
vention of cruelty to children or animals and no sub-
stantial part of the activities of which is carrying on prop-
aganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation.
(emphasis supplied).
The two flexible terms I have underlined have not operated
consistently with equity among organizations due to indefinite-
ness of the standards. They are not correlated. The problem is
the technical one of specification. While a umversity has, upon
judicial notice, been held to be "exclusively" educational,20 the
American Birth Control League was held not to be.2' If the or-
ganization is characterized by advocacy, the deduction is at times
denied as to one not "exclusively" educational.22 The World
League Against Alcoholism was held to be exclusively educa-
18Otto T. Mallery, 40 B.T.A. 778 (1989) (non acq.); cf. Estate of Agnes
C. Robinson, 1 T.C. 19 (1952) (acq.) (estate tax).
'9 Henry C. DuBois, 31 B.T.A. 239 (1934); Best Lock Co., 29 T.C. 389
(1957). Rev. Rul. 54-580, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 97, states that m this situation
there is no gift to the organization.2 0 Porter v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1932).
21 Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930).
22 John H. Watson, Jr., 27 B.T.A. 463 (1932).
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tional,23 and the Board of Temperance of the Methodist Church
was held exclusively religious while advocating legislation per-
taming to the liquor traffic.24 Many of these organizations from
the nature of their distinctive character must seek legislation for
the security and welfare of the organization qua organization.
This is distinguishable from seeking legislation affecting others in
order to further the stated goals of the organization.
Solution: The Committee might consider adding definitions
which would particularize the type of organizations referred to
and state a clearer guide concerning disqualifying advocacy or
legislative activities.
5. The Committee is aware of the fact that the contributions
deduction enables taxpayers at times to make money by giving
away other money (It may be asked whether the contribution
under a plan of that character meets the test of charitable mo-
tive which is what Congress no doubt intended to reward.) An
instance of this may be seen where taxpayer creates a trust with
the income to a qualified organization for a term of years, re-
mainder (corpus) to his wife, child or friend. This removes the
income from the top of his bracket for future years during the
term so that the net cost of the gift is only the "take home" part
of the dollar for each of those years. But, the commuted present
value of the term-for-years gift is also at once deductible. This
has a "bunching" effect which, because of his high bracket, can
result in tax savings in excess of his part of the cost of the gift.
The property (though not the whole income) is kept in the
family In this instance, progressive rates themselves enable the
taxpayer to escape their effect.
Solution: Require deductions to be allocated to the year of
current enjoyment by the organization and thus prevent "bunch-
ing." The Committee might, alternatively, consider a solution
similar to the 5% reversionary rule in Section 170(b) (1) (D)
phrased in terms of remainders to individuals generally
CHILD CARE EXPENSES. SECTION 214
1. The deduction for child care expenses is in need of tech-
nical amendment to remove a discrimination which was probably
2s Cochran v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 176 .(4th Cir. 1935).
2 4 Girard Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1941).
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not intended. Section 214(a) allows the deduction to "a tax-
payer who is a woman or a widower." Section 214(c) states
that "widower" includes an unmarned spouse who is separated
from his spouse under a decree of divorce or of separate main-
tenance. To the same effect is Treas. Reg. Section 1.214-1(b) (1)
Since a widower, or a husband who is divorced or judicially
separated, all postulate a once-married man, it follows that a
"woman" may have the allowance but that it is extended to males
only after they have once been marred. The result is that a
single man could not acknowledge his illegitimate child (by
taking it into his custody and incurring this expense) and receive
the benefit of this deduction. The same result would occur in
those states which permit a single person (male) to adopt a
child. The result undercuts that domestic relations law in prac-
tically all states which encourages acknowledgment of illegiti-
mate children, and, by bastardy actions, forces expenditures for
child care. Further, Congress is placed in a position of having
enacted a double standard with reference to a question of morals.
Solution: The unintended hardship and sexual discnmination
which appears in the statute might be solved by substituting
"man" for "widower" in Section 214(a)
EXTRAORDINARY MEDICAL EXPENSES: SECTION 21825
1. The Committee might consider statutory amendment to
disavow the decision in Robert S. Bassett.2 There even though
taxpayer met the statutory requirement (paid during) for the
tax year, his medical expenses were held nondeductible since
he paid for medical services to be furnished during a subsequent
tax year The taxpayer was on the cash receipts and disburse-
ments method of accounting. In effect the decision reads "and
incurred" into the statute where Congress has not so provided.
The court was probably concerned with the distortion of in-
come winch could result from voluntarily prepaving substantial
amounts of medical expenses. Yet the court indicated that if a
bill for medical expenses furnished in a prior year was paid cur-
29 The extraordinary medical expense deduction was added to the Code in
1942 and justified b the ddesire to raise and maintain health standards dunng
World War 1I, and in view of the hcavv tUxburdens of the war penod. S. Rep.
No. 16:31, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 96 (1942).2 6 26 T.C. 619 (1956).
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rently, the current deduction was proper. This, too, would have
a distorting effect upon income of the current year. Since this
particular deduction is limited to the time when it is "paid,"
regardless of the method of accounting used, denial of a deduc-
ton in the Basset case robbed the taxpayer of the deduction
completely The decision appears to overlook the fact that the
cash approach utilized in this section is always charactenzed
by some distortion. It may be noted that prepaid interest is de-
ductible..2 7 The convenience and simplicity of marking the de-
duction by payment is endangered by this decision. Although
the newest regulation indicates that the Commissioner would
not now follow the decision (see Treas. Reg. 1.213-1(a)-deduct
those expenses paid regardless of when the event causing .the
expense occurred), future influence of the decision could be
effectively laid 1y statutory amendment.
Solution: Insert in Section 213 "for medical services when-
ever rendered.
2. It is apparent that existing law discriminates in favor of
deductibility of expenses for medical services as against expenses
for purchases of commodities and products which are health-
incurred.2' Note the separate limitation (1%) on expenses for
drugs. Who is to say that drugs are less essential to mitigation of
condition than are services of the medical man? Recall also that
-deductibility subsidizes the activity to that extent. If drugs and
medical advice are essential for the cure, to prefer one over the
other offers uneven subsidy to the druggist when compared to the
physician, for example. It may be that the limitation on drugs
grew out of the practice involving drug store charge accounts so
operated that sundries and department store items were billed as
"drugs" for reasons of substantiation of the deduction. If so, this
27 I.T. 3740, 1 Cum. Bull. 109 (1945).
28 According to a study by the Social Security Administration released Dec.
23, 1959, the public paid nearly $4.4 billion in 1958 for medicines and medical
appliances while only paying $4.3 billion for medical services (fees of physicians,
dentists, etc.). Insurance companies paid nearly $1.3 billion of the bills for serv-
ices. The total pnvate health cost was $16.4 billion. Half of the $5.1 billion charge
for hospital bills was covered by insurance. Social Security Adinistration, Bulletin
(Dec. 1959). The Health Insurance Institute reported, Dec. 20, 1959, that more
than 123,000.000 citizens were covered by health insurance and that these mdi-
viduals spent an average of $95 per person for medical care dunng 1958. In ten
states, more than half of the population had no health insurance, a condition
which invites a direct subsidy approach rather than subsidy ii the form of tax
deductions for medical expenses.
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is a rather arbitrary form of enforcement technique penalizing
honest taxpayers in order to snare the dishonest ones.
While few sick persons would be motivated in mcurmng
expenses for mitigation or cure solely by tax considerations as
above discussed, discrumination against deductibility of the ex-
pense of medical products and major property improvements
exists by reason of lack of clarity as to deductibility of what is
essentially a capital outlay for the purpose. Is the hay fever
victim's air conditioner, for example, to be expensed in a single
year, amortized over a period of years, or demed deduction al-
together by reason of the size of the expense? The problem
assumes that the purchase is sufficiently related to the condition
as to constitute a true medical expense. Will the fact that the
expense is capital in nature then prevent the allowance? The
cases and rulings appear to have, at tines, emphasized the dis-
tortion of income aspect at the expense of allowing any deduc-
tion whatsoever. Other cases take refuge in the fact capital ex-
penditures are not "expenses," or that a permanent improvement
to property has been made.29
Solution: Medical expenses for drugs should be given parity
with other medical expenses by removing the 1% floor provi-
sion. Medical expenses for products and improvements having
a useful life in excess of the current year should be amortized
over that period and a deduction be extended for each such year
during which the item is used for the defined medical purposes.
Some correlation with section 263(a) (1) concerning perman-
ent inprovements to property, might be desirable.
29 Some of the illustrative citations on the problem generally include: John
L. Seymour, 14 T.C. 1111 (1950) (oil heating furnace not deductible); Rev.
Rul. 54-57, 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 67 (elevator and swimming pool not deductible);
Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 307, modified in Rev. Rul. 58-8, 1958-1
Cum. Bull. 5; Hayne Estate, 23 T.B. 113 (1954) (elevator not deductible);
Hollander v. Comnussioner, 219 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1955) (stairseat elevator
deductible); Jerome W Benesch, 13 T.C.M. 1116 (elevator not deductible); Rev.
Rul. 58-155, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 12 (reclining chair deductible); Post v. United
States, 150 F Supp. 299 (S.D. Ala. 1956) (elevator deductible); F J. Delp,
30 T.C. 1230 (1958) (dust elimnnation system not deductible); W.E. Snelling,
149 F Supp. 825 (E.D. Va. 1956) (elevator deductible). See also Treas. Reg.
§1.21-1(e)(1)(iii), which states:
A capital expenditure for a permanent improvement or better-
ment of property shall not be deductible as an expenditure for medical
care, even though it may have some relation to medical care. If
related only to the sick person and not related to the permanent
improvement or betterment of property, it shall, however, be de-
ductible.
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3. The medical deduction for persons 65 years of age and
over appears to be highly preferential to these persons at the
expense of other taxpayers. Ability to pay is directly affected
by medical expenses in that they are not a matter of choice.
Yet these persons may exclude Social Security benefits received,
are given a retirement income credit, and are each granted an
additional $600 personal exemption.30 And these concessions op-
erate against what is usually a lower bracket income in the first
instance. The medical deduction section does not apply the 8%
"floor" provision to them.3' Justification for this treatment has
referred to the fact of decreased earnings and increased medical
expenses at this age.3 2 The concept that these are to be for
extraordinary medical costs is violated here. Additionally, if one
spouse is 65 years of age or more, the expense of his or her
spouse who is under 65 years of age also becomes deductible
without operation of the "floor" provision. This appears to make
it questionable whether the real purpose was to recognize the
years in excess of 65 as years of increased medical bills.
Solution: Abolish special medical provisions applicable to
spouses where one or both is 65 years of age or over. This
would simplify the computation and relieve the Internal Rev-
enue Service from adminmistering this additional complication on
the medical deduction. It would increase the progressive effect
of the rates. As to the person under 65 who is the spouse of a
person 65 or over it would remove an unfair preference.
4. The maximum deduction is allowed according to a "rough"
approximation which is stated in terms of number of personal
exemptions regardless of whether there were any expenses on
each of these persons or not. Thus unduly high excessive ex-
penses on one dependent child in a large family become deduc-
tible where the otherwise "ceiling" would prevent their deduc-
30 On returns for 1957, 168 million personal exemptions were claimed. A total
of 6.5 million exemptions due to age (for persons 65 years or older) or for blind-
ness under section 151 were claimed. U.S. Treasury Department, Statistics of
Income-1957, Individual Income Tax Returns (Sept. 1959).
sT " floor" provision which demes deduction for amounts less than a
stated percentage of adjusted gross, on the theory that these are "ordinary" med-
ical expenses for a family unit, was formerly set at 5%. It was lowered to 3%
when the 1954 Code was enacted. Recent studies indicate 58 percent of all fam-
lies recur medical expenses under 5% of adjusted gross income dunng the average
year. Anderson & Feldman, Family Medical Costs and Voluntary Health Insur-
ance: A Nationwide Survey 935 (1956).
32 S. Rep. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1951).
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tion, while the same expenses on an only child are partially de-
ductible. In terms of rough averages, the more persons perhaps
the more medical expenses, but the provision may be discrim-
inatorv in operation.
Solution: The Committee might consider imposing a period-
of-illness requirement to be applied before that persons per-
sonal exemption is made available in computing the "ceiling"
figures.
INTEREST SECTION 163
1. As a general principle, certain values may be found in
the proposition that income tax accounting and good account-
ing practice should correspond. On occasion, however, distinc-
tions must be made to prevent unfairness and arbitrary results.
Section 163 permits the deduction of interest if "paid or ac-
crued." It is possible for an accrual basis taxpayer to deduct for
accrued interest owed and later never pay it. The problem
chiefly concerns businesses operating on accrual accounting, but
is also a personal deduction problem in that individuals may
account in that fashion.3" Of course, section 267 disallows the
deduction if the amount is owed to a related cash-basis taxpayer.
The judicial gloss appears to be that so long as a prospect exists
that payment will ultimately be made the deduction is permis-
sible. If there is no reasonable prospect of this, the court deci-
sions are divided as to deductibility "
Solution: At least for individuals, provide that personal in-
terest is deductible onl when "paid." This will prevent deduc-
tion where the expense has not actually been sustained in some
cases and m others will postpone the deduction until the ex-
pense has actually been paid.
2. It is not clear under present law whether the first pay-
ments on a loan dischalge interest or principal. The situation
arises where the loan agreement makes no provision as to this
-" :3 Section 4-6( c) (2).".. .. . . . . .
.4 For cases and rulings illustrative of this problem, see Fabs v. Martin, 224
F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1955): Keebev s Inc. v. Paschal, 188 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1951);
Zhrunennan Steel Co. v. Conmissioner, 130 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1942); Woodward
Iron Co. v. United States. 159 F Supp. 54 (N.D. Ala. 1945- Albany & N.11v.
v. Allen, 84 F Supp. 666 (M.I). Ga. 1949); Panhandle Refining Co.. 45 B.T.A.
651 (1941). Millar Brainard, 7 T.C. 1180 (1946); Butler Consol. Coal Co.. 6 T.C.
18:3 (1946). Florencce learlinan, 4 T.C. :34 (1944); Nathan I. Gordon Corp., 2
T.C. 571 (1943) (cq.) (Commissioners appeal to CA-1 nolle pros)- I.T. 36:35,
1944 Cum. Bull. 101.
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problem. The judicial approach lacks proper guidance from the
statute, and in some instances the result has turned on state
law which opens up the opportunity for non-uniform results on
this federal question.
3 5
Solution: Section 163 might be amended to make provision
for proper allocation of payments to principal and interest. To
what extent is the agreement of the parties to control?
3. In a few cases, of which Dorzbach v Collison,8 may be
an extreme example, it has been held that interest paid at an
excessive rate may be deducted. In Collimon this rate was 25%
While there was an alternative ground in the case for the deci-
sion, the court pointed out that there is no stated requirement
that the amount be ordinary, necessary or reasonable. In Coi-
s-ion the amount was paid for money borrowed from taxpavers
wife. While the advantageous joint return makes the spouse a
less likely recipient of excessive interest payments today (be-
cause of the split income concept), other family members may
be so favored. In effect this permits the reallocation of ones
income within the family while receiving a deduction for the
allocation. The suggestion might be made that if the rate violates
a usury statute it is to that extent- a payment violating public
policy The states differ on permissible interest rates, however,
both in terms of absolutes and relative to the size of the loan.
7
The judicial gloss as to personal deductions violating public policy
is not itself completely clear.
Solution: The Committee might consider writing into the per-
sonal interest deduction, if it be retained at all, the limitation
that the rate of interest be ordinary and be reasonable in amount.
Further, that the American Law Institute suggestion concern-
ing public policy might well be considered: Disallow any interest
disbursement which is itself illegal or contrary to public policy
15 E.g., Warner Co. v. Commissioner, II T.C. 419 (1948). aff'd, 181 F.2d
599 (.3d Cir. 1950); Lustig v. United States, 138 F Supp. 870 (Ct.Cl. 1956);
Theodore R. Plunkett, 41 B.T.A. 700 (1940) (acq.); When Clothing Co., 1
B.T.A. 973 (1925) (acq.)- NV F Petit, 8 T.C. 228 (1947).
3 195 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1952).
37 Ark., Cal., Okla.. Tenn., and Texas have constitutional ceilings on permis-
sible interest rates. All other states except Colo., Me., Mass., and N.H. have
statutory ceilings. The most common maximum rates are 5% to 8% per year.
but a few states pernit up to 12%. There is also small loan legislation in for-tv
one states, permitting rates as high as 36% per year, applicable to amounts bor-
rowed as large as $1,000.00.
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or a disbursement of interest the deduction of which for tax pur-
poses would frustrate a public policy These changes would pre-
vent avoidance of the progressive rate feature through rather
artificial borrowings within the related taxpayer area, and pre-
vent an undercutting of local concepts regarding a permissible
'%pound of flesh." Those who should not be rewarded would no
longer be rewarded, leakage would be stopped and the tax base
maintained."
4. The statute makes all interest deductible. Interest on tax
deficiencies is therefore deductible. This creates differences of
opinion as to proper year of deduction. There is a question wheth-
er it should be deductible in any event. Deductibility has re-
quired definition and distinction between "penalty" and "in-
terest." That problem would disappear. So would the problem
of whether a lump sum tax settlement "paid" interest as a part
thereof. To some extent the interest on an overdue tax is an m-
centive device; to some extent a penalizing factor.3 9 Some blur-
ring of concept may be seen; e.g. if paid for delay in filing a
return it is penalty and not interest, as are all "additions to tax."
Solution: The suggestion is that "interest" be defined as ex-
cluding interest paid in connection with tax liabilities.
5. There is still leakage from the tax base through the
interest deduction where the deductible amount is paid on loans
to buy insurance, endowment or annuity The Commissioner
has resisted deduction of interest where the money was borrow-
ed for non-income producing purposes.40 The Treasury has pro-
posed that a deduction not be allowed for any amount paid as
interest under these personal insurance plans. Your Committee
has acted several times to tighten up this area.41 The latest amend-
ment prevents deduction where a substantial number of future
premiums are deposited with the company, treating this as a
single premium contract. The Commissioner has ruled that "in-
terest" payments are really just premium payments where the
purchase was loan-inspired.42 Court decisions conflict on whether
38ALI Fed. Income Tax Stat. 49 (1949 Draft); ALI Fed. Income Tax Stat.
129 (1950 Draft).
39 See Max T. Davis, 46 B.T.A. 663 (1942) (acq.); Northwestern Motor
Car Co., 15 B.T.A. 1276 (1929); 1 Cum. Bull. 247. 2 Cum. Bull. 227.
40 See, e.g., Preston v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 763 (2d Cir. 1942).
41 Section 264.
42 Rev. Rul. 54-94, 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 53.
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this is "interest,"43 and have led to a judicial requirement of a
bona fide borrowing purpose.
The arrangement in question is to finance by borrowing
against the cash value of the policy in order to buy the insur-
ance and pay premiums thereon. An interest-deductible loan is
used to purchase an asset the earnings of which are not cur-
rently taxable and may never be taxed. At the heart of the prob-
lem is the rule that these premium payments are a personal ex-
pense and not deductible. The advantage is for the high bracket
taxpayer. The deduction which is created saves tax dollars for
him to the extent that the net cost of the policy is less than the
amount accruing to hIs cash surrender value and he also re-
ceives the insurance protection. By reason of the deduction
against high bracket income, he can borrow at an interest rate
which, after the deduction, is less than -what the policy will
earn for him. Thus at a 50% bracket, 4% interest has a net cost
to the taxpayer of 2%. The borrowed sums may be placed so
that the policy accumulates a 21/2% rate of return. One-half
percent is clear gain (not all credited to surrender value, how-
erer, since cost of insurance coverage and company overhead
must be paid from this amount) This shelter also shows ad-
vantages when the gain is taken down at maturity Where the
cash surrender value is collected or at maturity, the basis to be
subtracted from the amount received is the premium cost not
including interest. Since the premium rate includes the insur-
ance cost (agent's fees, e.g.) often the cash surrender amount
does not exceed the basis (premiums paid) Further, section
72(e) (3) permits the gain to be averaged over a three-year
period. If the policy is one of life insurance and collected only
by reason of death, the appreciation is never taxed under the
income tax law 4' These tax advantages encourage the promo-
tion of a sale for a small cash payment and a loan for the bal-
ance. The interest deduction reduces the net cost to less than
the added value produced by the policy
While the depositing of a substantial number of future pay-
ments with the company is treated as if a single premium con-
43 Compare United States v. Bond, 258 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1958), with W
Stuart Emmons, 31 T.C. 26 (1959).
44 Section 101(a).
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tract had been acquired 45 there is no restriction on a deduction
of interest for funds borrowed to pay current premiums. This
problem was before the Committee at the time of consideration
of the Techmical Amendments Bill of 195746 The suggestion
that interest be disallowed if the policy was obtained under a plan
which contemplated that a substantial number of premiums be
paid through indebtedness was rejected because of the subjec-
tive nature of the test proposed. The problem remains where
money is borrowed to carry an annual payment policy
Insurance policies have been rewritten and recomputed m
order to facilitate the use of these policy-stripping plans. Higher
initial cash surrender values have been provided so that the
collateral will support the loan. There is evidence that not all
companies agree that these plans are in the best interest of the
industry 47 There is some actunal danger in spreading the cost
of the insurance coverage over longer periods of time m order
to create higher initial cash surrender values. I have no specific
information as to current figures on incidence of these plans.
Recent increases in interest rates on conventional loans affect the
problem, but may merely shift the loan from bank loan to com-
pany-carried plans. If disallowance is decreed some thought
must be given to the occasional hardship case where insured
must borrow in order to meet a current premium though this
was not necessarily contemplated when the policy was purchased.
There is evidence from the latest cases that the Commissioner
is making progress in attacking these profitable arrangements
effected through the deduction for interest by urging the form-
substance dichotomy of Gregory v Helvering.45 That solution,
however, requires litigation and the result is unpredictable in
individual cases without it.
Solution: The Committee might draft through force along
these lines: "Interest on personal loans shall be disallowed if
the taxpayer s tax bracket is such that a deduction for interest
45 Section 264.
46 U.S. Treasury Dept.. Problems for Technical Amendments Bill (1957);
•-.R. Committee on Ways and Means. Bteanngs on Technical Amendments 95,
168, :325 (1956).
47 The Insurance l)epartment of the State of New York announced, on Oct.
14. 1959. a new regulation restncting the sale of "high-earlv-cash-value policies"
sold in connection with "iniinmin deposit plans" to be effective Nov. 1, 1959.
48293 U.S. 465 (19:35).
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would so mitigate the cost of credit that increment from invest-
ment of the borrowed money in life insurance exceeds the cost
of his credit." Or, the cost of the policy computed on surrender
or at maturity might be reduced in the amount of interest paid
to acquire or carry it to the extent allowed or allowable, giving
a postponed effect to the disallowance.4 9 This might be accom-
panied by an amendment to section 101(a) treating the dis-
allowed interest as income received from a decedent where un-
surrendered life insurance is collected at death. This approach
is similar to section 170(b) (4) reducing the amount of a deduc-
tible contribution by the amount of interest required in order
to make it. Some attention might also be given to definmg "in-
debtedness" in section 163(a) if motive in borrowing is to be
considered.
INTEREST AND TAXES FOR HOME OWNERS:
SECTIONS 163-164
1. In Treas. Reg. section 1.212-1(h) it is provided that or-
dinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in connection
with the management, conservation, or maintenance of property
held for use as a residence by the taxpayer are not deductible.
Interest and taxes on this investment, the increment from which
(right to occupy) is tax-free are, however, deductible. Code
treatment is that, in general, disbursements offsetting items
the income from which is not includible are ordinarily denied
deduction." In lieu of disallowance of these items, the compen-
sating approach would be to include the imputed income re-
sulting from occupancy of one's home. The British do so in their
tax law
There is a lack of equity here when the home owner's posi-
tion is compared to that of the taxpayer who rents a residence.
Rent, for him, is a personal expense paid from his after-tax
dollars and not deductible. Yet the home owner's capital invest-
ed in the house might otherwise be invested and income-produc-
ing. His gain from its use is apparent. Further, statistics prove
40 Cf. Chapin v. McGowan, CCH 1958 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (58-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. 9469) (taxpayer cannot deduct interest from gain at maturity).
oE.g., §265; cf. Edward M. Stout, P-1l Tax Ct. Mem. 530-39, afl'd, 210
F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1954) (if occupied by relatives rent-free, expenses connected
with house owned by taxpayer are not deductible).
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that the incidence of home ownership increases directly with
increases in income. The number of persons benefiting is there-
fore greater among the higher tax brackets thus blunting the
progression intended by the rate schedule adopted. If the deduc-
tion of mortgage interest and real property taxes is intended
as a subsidy to encourage home ownership it is inefficient in the
sense that aid in acquiring a home is most needed by persons in
the lower brackets.
The size of this problem appears when it is shown that
over ten percent of consumer expenditures are made for housing
and that an estimated four billion dollars is the excluded im-
puted income from home ownership.51
The difficulties in taxing this imputed income are several,
including the unanswered question of whether the Supreme
Court would uphold the attempt to do so.52 Some method of
valuing the rental value of these millions of structures would
have to be adopted."'
Not to be overlooked is the advantage that the home owner
has in being able to itemize deductions rather than to take the
standard deduction. It is easier for him to accumulate enough
deductions, starting with his sizeable interest and tax deductions
on the house, to make it advantageous to itemize deductions
totaling in excess of the standard deduction. This makes this
group the primary beneficiary of the other permissible personal
deductions.
Solution: Tax imputed income arismg from one's right to
occupy his own home, or, limit deductions for interest or taxes
on personal residences. These expenses are not only personal
in nature and completely foreign to business activities, but are
unrelated to an income tax-producing asset. A provision dis-
51 Balch, Individual Income Taxes and Housing, 11 Nat'l Tax J. 168 (1958).
52 n Helvenng v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371 (1934), a case
which was limited to the tax problem of an insurance company, the Supreme
Court stated that rental value of owner-occupied buildings was not income to
such taxpayers, and indicated that a constitutional issue might exist if the statute
tried to tax this amount as income. But the Court upheld disallowance of the
tax deductions on the building. Their allowance was conditioned on inclusion of
rental value. The theory was that since Congress could have demed these deduc-
tions completely they could so condition them.
53 They have been evaluated: For a recent year the estimate of the net
rental value of owner occupied dwellings in the United States was $3.8 billion.
U.S. Department of Commerce, National Income (1951).,
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allowing these as deductions could be introduced over a period
of years through the use of gradually increasing ceiling limita-
tions.
TAXES7' SECTION 164
1. Discrinination among cigarette smokers is found due to
the variation in deductibility of the cigarette taxes from state
to state. Cigarette taxes are shifted forward to the ultimate
consumer almost without fail, although not always as a tax.
The rigid requirements that the tax must be placed on the con-
sumer as a tax or that it must be separately stated, have led a
number of states to restructure their local tax laws to gain this
advantage for their citizen-smokers.5 4 The result is to frustrate
traditional local tax patterns which have usually placed the tax
on the wholesale distributor. The smaller number of wholesalers
than retailers has centralized tax enforcement efforts of the states.
This factor has led to the veto of proposed revisions in cigarette
taxes designed to gain the federal advantage. This was Arkansas'
experience, for example.5
Solution: Specify that cigarette tax borne by a taxpayer who
is the consumer either in the form of a tax or an increased sale
price shall be deductible by him, or, provide that no cigarette
or tobacco taxes shall be deductible as taxes. 56
2. Sub-sections 164(b) (5) (A)-(B) have all the earmarks of
"sacred cow" legislation designed to aid a particular taxpayer or
small group of taxpayers. While written in general terms the
tailored requirements make such provisions highly discriminatory
Permitting deduction of special assessments for maintenance
5 4 See the Oklahoma expenience: Commissioner v. Thompson, 193 F.2d
586 (10th Cir. 1951); I.T. 2919, XI'/-2 Gum. Bull. 86, and Rev. Rul 54-50, 1954-1
Cum. Bull. 55.
55 H.B. 115, introduced durng the 1959 session of Arkansas General As-
sembly, would have declared that the impact of the cigarette tax was on the
user of cgarettes. The retailer would have been required to list the tax se -
arately and collect it from each user. The measure passed but was vetoed by te
Governor because "the burden of adminstering the collection of cigarette taxes
under this measure would be insurmountable, both from the standpoint of the
state and the seller."
56 The effect upon the revenues is seen from these figures: 442,328,000,000
cigarettes were manufactured in 1957. U.S. Bur. Census, Statistical Abstract of
the U.S.. 1959. In one-fourth of the states the tax is on the smoker; in three-
fourths of the states it is deductible by the dealer. At a tax rate of $3 er 1,000
cigarettes (Arkansas rate), the person who smokes a package a day pays
approximately $22.00 a year in state tax.
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or repair on non-income producing assets, as here provided, is
strange. Most of these are for the creation or maintenance of
betterments to real property and would ordinarily show a post-
poned effect through being added to capital account. Further,
any bond interest is owed by the improvements district, not by
the taxpayer. At one time rulings and decisions were to that
effect.5 7 Later cases like Lee Wilson &Co.,8 Andrew Little,9
and Harwell v Comnisswner ° allowed deduction on a theory
that amounts of tax used for repair, interest and maintenance are
not to be capitalized since the value of the property was not
increased by the expenditures.6
It is difficult to reconcile this deduction with Section 263(a)
(1) which provides for capitalizing betterments made to increase
the value of any property or estate. If the more proper analogy
be to expenses for incidental repairs and maintenance, as dis-
tinguished from capital improvements, it may still be stated
that no improvement district expense or interest should be de-
ducted where the property bettered is not income-producing.
Section 164(b)(5)(B) is applicable only where a special
taxing district covers the whole of at least one county and at
least 1,000 persons are subject to the taxes levied by the district.
The tax must be ad valorum at a uniform rate and utilize the
same value as is used for purposes of the real property tax.
Rev. Rul. 55-284, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 25, discovered an improve-
ment district which would fit these tailored qualifications at an
early date after adoption of this provision by the 1954 Code.
Solution: Repeal section 164(b)(5)(B) which has the dis-
crimmato y effect of making certain improvement taxes deduct-
ible where as a general rule they are not. The phrase justifying
the disallowance of improvement taxes generally-"of a kind
F A. Smith, 11 B.T.A. 301 (1928); I.T. 2044, 111-2 Gum. Bull. 98.
8 25 B.T.A. 840 (1932) (acq.).
5921 B.T.A. 911 (1930) (acq.).
611 170 F.2d 517 (10th Cir. 1948).
61 Taxes paid to an improvement district and used for maintenance and in-
terest pavnents were recognized as deductible in the Revenue Act of 1928. Pub.
Law 562. 70th Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 852, 45 Stat. 791. U.S. Treas. Regs. section
1.164-4(b) (1) recognizes them as deductible. All personal interest is deductible
so there is no problem there. Where the amount goes for maintenance charges.
Mid the payor is a business it may be a business expense deduction. Section
162(a). But where the taxpayer is an individual not engaged in business it would
appear that these sunis should be made non-deductible.
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tending to increase the value of the property assessed"-causes
confusion and might be taken out of the statute. Change treat-
ment of items in section 164(b) (5) (A) so that, to the extent
incurred in betterment of non-income producing property, these
expenditures must be capitalized.
3. Any state or local transfer taxes on property payable by
stamps or otherwise should be required to be capitalized, and
should not be deductible as a current expense under section
164.62
Solution: Amend section 164 to so provide.
4. The committee might undertake the disallowance of de-
ductions for all state and local sales and excise taxes.63 For many
years now federal excises have not been deductible. The statute
would be easier to -enforce if this were done due to the reason-
able estimate approach which must now be used.64 There is
probably a great deal of leakage here, along with disparity in
amounts allowed to be deducted by taxpayers similarly situated.
The move would make the statute more uniform in application
because the rate of present sales and excise taxes vary from state
to state in a rather substantial manner. This would also remove
the less-than-successful test used to determine upon whom the
tax is imposed where it has been originally imposed on the re-
tailer and shifted forward by price manipulation. 6'5 The amount
62 Federal stamp taxes (transfer tax) are not deductible as taxes. Section
164(b)(3). They do enter the computation of gain or loss on the sale of assets
as a part of the expense of sale, however. I.T. 3806, 1946-2 Cum. Bull. 41.
63 State estate, gift, and inheritance taxes were, by the Revenue Act of 1934,
made non-deductible on the justification that they are charges imposed on the
transfer of capital and are expenses not incurred in the production of income.
H.R. Rep. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 22. Yet the other state and local levies
also of a personal nature remain deductible.
(4 It was reported on Nov. 4, 1959, that District Directors of the Internal
Revenue Senice have been given new authority to release guidelines to be used
by taxpayers in deducting estimated amounts for state and local sales taxes.
Office Memo.. Public Information Division, Int. Rev. Serv., Oct. 26. 1959. re-
fernng to Memo of Oct. 19, 1959, sent Regional Commissioners bv Director of
Audit Division. The guidelines would indicate whether amounts propised to be
deducted are reasonable and acceptable to the Service. Unfortunately use of the
authority given is discretionary with the individual District Directors.
05 The sales or use tax is deductible by the consumer if he pavs the tax or
where, though not imposed upon him by law, the amount is separatel" stated
and lie pays it. Section 164(c)(1). In 16 states the general sales tax statute
places the tax on the consumer. In 17 states it is levied against the retail merch-
ant and deductible by the consumer only where separately stated. Two states
(Penna. and Wash.) have recently increased the rate of their tax to 4% making
the question of deductibility even more important.
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of this .deduction is sufficiently great to affect the progression
problem."8
Solution: Amend section 164 disallowing deduction for state
or local political subdivision sales or excise taxes except where
the expense is a business expense (section 162) or section 212
expense in its entirety
CASUALTY LOSSES. SECTION 165(c)
1. The nature of the occurence which gives rise to possible
deduction under this section is not always clear. Justification for
the allowance is for the supplementing of low personal exemp-
tion figures for involuntary-incurred, unexpected, necessary, per-
sonal expenses due to loss of property The statute refers to
loss from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty or from theft.7
The phrase "other casualty" has been held to be construed under
the rule ejusdem generzs in some cases and as. an independent
type of recognizable loss in others."' Blasting and other human-
caused losses have been allowed. In general the courts have read
into the statute the common elements of fire, storm or ship-
wreck, and have held that the loss must be characterized by a
sudden, unexpected or unusual cause from an event of nature
or at least from some external violent force. Confusion in the
requirement is seen from the handling of drought losses. A
drought is not, by nature, a sudden event. Therefore, if allowed
it may be that the result and not the cause is recognized as
making the loss an allowable one. This in turn has led to cases
which tned to determine whether the requirement of sudden-
ness is satisfied by a sudden discovery of the loss. The statutory
listing offers some support for recognizing consequences as well
as causes. "Shipwreck" is a consequence of some event and
68 For 1957, state tax collections from general sales and use taxes totaled
approximately $3.3 billion. In addition, $5 billion were collected from selective
sales taxes on items such as gasoline, alcoholic beverages, tobacco, and insurance.
Council of State Governments, The Book of the States, 1958-59, 190 (1960).
A part of this was paid by business entities and would be deductible in any event
as a business expense.
67 The Act of Mar. 2, 1867, 14 Stat 471, 477, is the source of the onginal
0', ]phrase which read: "from fires, shipwreck." The phrase "other casualty and
from theft" was added in 1916 without Committee comment as to intention. Pub.
Law 271, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756.
68 See Shearer v. Anderson, 16 F.2d 995 (1927), holding that there are no
words in the statute and no legislative history limiting the event to an act of
nature.
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occasion for a loss. "Fire ' is a cause. "Other casualty" expresses
the result rather than the cause.69
Solution: Amend section 165 to eliminate reference to specific
types of causes and consequences, and provide instead that un-
expected "causes and consequences" arising from identifiable
events which result in loss to the taxpayers property are deduct-
ible, i.e., adopt a more general description of the situation creat-
ing the loss, or ,describe the required result which qualifies
the loss.
2. There is some question about the meaning of "theft" as
used in section 165(3) In cases such as Edwards v Blomberg,0
Bordon v Commissioner TI Earle v Commissioner,72 and Curtis
H. Muncte,73 it has been held that "theft" is to be defined accord-
ing to the law of the state or nation where the event occurs. In
Edwards, Georgia criminal law defined theft as including any
criminal appropriation of another's property, inculding embezzle-
ment.
The result here should not be made to turn on state criminal
laws. There was a distinction at common law between larceny,
which involved a wrongful taking of possession, and embezzle-
ment. In the latter, possession was by right but the property
was then intentionally converted. This distmction still exists
in state law On the other hand, the victim may think either
situation results in a "theft" of his property
Solution: Define "theft" in section 165(c)(3) so that it in-
eludes any criminal appropriation of another's property includ-
ing, but not limited to the following: larceny, embezzlement,
swindling, obtaining property under false pretenses, or other
wrongful and permanent deprivation of the taxpayer's property
3. The Committee might consider placing a "floor" on casu-
alty loss deductions. This would eliminate consideration of minor
losses which may be absorbed by the taxpayer without great
economic sacrifice, but retain the deduction to compensate for
loss of ability to pay tax as the result of a major disaster. This
would make the dedfiction easier to administer since effort could
69 Ibid.
70 282 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956).
71 101 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1939).
7272 F.2d 366 (2d Cir. 1935).
73 18 T.C. 839 (1952).
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be concentrated upon verifying a fewer number of deductions.
It would mitigate the fact that a benefit is received by the gov-
ernment under insurance policies against loss which are carmed
by the taxpayer, premiums on which are not now allowed to be
deducted. (Note the contrary approach m the medical deduc-
tion section.)
LEGAL EXPENSES IN ALIMONY ACTIONS.
SECTIONS 212 & 262
The legal expenses incurred in connection with a divorce are
deemed to be personal expenses-section 262-and not deductible.
But legal expenses in relation to alimony (which is taxable as
income) present a problem. Under the principle that the expense
be deducted (section 212) the wife or ex-wife is allowed to
deduct the costs of obtaining alimony or an increase m alimony,
thus encouraging her to do so by subsidizing the act. There is
real doubt, however, concerning the husband's right to deduct
the cost of defending the same legal action. If the expense is
based on his attempt to avoid liability generally, there is no
deduction. Where he relates the possible liability on his part to
his property which is held for the production of income, how-
ever, some cases have allowed the expense under section 212.
This is particularly true where the controversy deemphasizes the
liability itself and emphasizes the issue of how to discharge it.
Four recent cases allowing him a deduction are Baer v Commis-
&toner,4 McMuty v United States, 5 Bowers v Comnussioner,76
and J A. Fisher v United States.77 It appears that the Tax Court
will not apply the rule developed in this line of cases. It holds
all expenses in connection with divorce and its incidents to be
personal expenses. Cf also, Lykes v United States,7 which in-
dicates that the expense of minimizing a liability is not deduct-
ible. There the court said deductibility is tested by the immedi-
ate purpose and not the remote consequence of the expenditure.
Treas. Reg. 1.212-1 (in) disallows deduction where property
would be required to be sold or used to satisfy the liability This
74 196 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1952).
75 132 F Supp. 114 (Ct. CI. 1955).
76243 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1957).
-7 157 F Supp. 364 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
78343 U.S. 118 (1952).
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appears contrary to the cases cited above. It is not yet apparent
whether the Commissioner will, in this manner, be able to over-
come judicial decisions which have developed a contrary view
Solution: Amend section 262 to specify that all expenses for
legal fees and court costs in connection with actions for ali-
mony, divorce, or separate maintenance constitute a personal ex-
pense which shall be non-deductible. This will place the par-
ticipants upon an equal footing as to the net cost of maintaining
such actions. It will remove the necessity for allocating alimony
portions of the cost where both divorce and alimony are ele-
ments of the same action, as is usually true. It will clarify sec-
tion 212 so that at least for expenses of this variety the resulting
effect upon property held does not control. Property is always
taken to satisfy judgments and decrees awarded in terms of
money regardless of the nature of the legal action.
